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In our example, the efficient allocation involves first
allocating all of the common water to the groundwater
district, then sharing the water between the two districts,
and finally, allocating the common water to the surface
water district. It is only when the common source is
shared that the marginal valuation of water is equalized
across the two districts, after allowance for
transportation costs.

INTRODUCTION (Section 1)
The combination of increasing water scarcity and fiscal
discipline has intensified the search for methods that
increase the efficiency of water use. One method in
particular that has received considerable attention in
both theory and practice is the institution of interdistrict
water trading. It is generally assumed that water trading
can correct the inefficiencies of historically or
politically determined water entitlements by equalizing
the marginal value of water across districts.

Section 2 below reviews the principles of efficient
allocation over space and time. Section 3 provides
principles for a more general model and applies them to
the Hawaii case. Section 4 summarizes the primary
principles for efficient inter-district allocation and
provides concluding remarks regarding alternative
institutions for approximating that solution.

We show in this paper that the simplifying assumptions
under which water trading achieves efficient water
allocation are rather severe. In a more realistic setting, a
water authority is needed to establish rules and
standards such that trading can achieve and sustain an
efficient outcome.

EFFICIENT SPATIAL AND INTERTEMPORAL
WATER ALLOCATION (Section 2)

In particular, we investigate the complicating role that
space and time have on optimal water allocation rules.
In a model where water transport is not costless, water
at different locations have different values in the
efficient solution. Similarly, when water storage is
feasible but not costless (e.g. when groundwater is
among the important sources of water) the spatial
allocation problem is neither separable across periods
nor does the intertemporal allocation problem have a
simple and obvious solution. Finally, transportation
cost functions may be non-linear in distance and
volume: in addition, such functions might be
discontinuous as well.

Principles of Efficient Spatial Allocation (Section 2.1)
Suppose there is a single source of surface water (e.g. a
diversion dam) and several users at different locations.
The marginal cost of water at the headworks is just the
cost of operating the facility to let an additional unit of
water flow out (possibly negligible) plus the user cost
(rent plus interest plus depreciation) of the additional
headworks capacity needed for that marginal unit.
Efficient water allocation to a user adjacent to the
headworks requires that this marginal cost of water
equal the marginal benefit to the user. If the user is a
farmer, for example, the marginal benefit is the value of
the additional product that the marginal unit of water
provides.

This paper discusses these complicating factors in a
realistic setting involving two water districts on the
Island of Oahu, Hawaii. The two districts are separated
by a natural barrier but supplied by a common source.
In addition to the shared source, one district has
groundwater while the other has its own surface water
supplies. Over time, the efficient solution involves
changes in the allocation of the common water source.

The marginal cost of water at a more distant location is
the marginal cost of “producing” the water (as above)
plus the marginal cost of transporting the water from the
headworks to the user. The transport cost in turn is the
user cost of the additional conveyance capacity needed
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are thought to be preferable to centralized mechanisms
such as water rationing. Water pricing will achieve
efficient allocation if the marginal price for each user is
set equal to the locational efficiency price at the user’s
location. Intramarginal prices need not be so set. For
example, the water authority may attain both efficiency
and equity through block pricing, the simplest form of
which is to charge nothing for an amount judged to be a
necessity2 and the locational efficiency price for all
subsequent units. This simple pricing scheme achieves
both efficiency and progressivity in the sense that the
average price increases with the amount of water
consumed.

to transport the marginal unit of water plus the value of
water lost in conveyance (e.g. through evaporation,
seepage, and percolation).
Ideally, conveyance
structures are designed to minimize transportation costs
such that the marginal cost of reducing conveyance
losses by one unit is equal to the marginal benefit of the
water thus saved. In summary, efficient allocation
requires setting the net marginal benefit at each location
in the water distribution system, after deducting the
marginal transportation cost, to the marginal cost of
1
providing water at the headworks of the system.
We define the marginal cost at the headworks as the
“system efficiency price” and the gross marginal benefit
(before deducting transport costs) as the locational
efficiency price. The efficiency conditions stated above
imply that the locational efficiency prices differ by the
transportation cost between locations and that the
system efficiency price is the locational efficiency price
at the headworks.

If there are substantial non-linearities in production and
transport costs, however, then marginal costs are
dependent on the quantities consumed, which the water
authority may not be able to accurately estimate without
knowing the marginal benefit schedules for its (possibly
diverse) clientele.
This problem may be largely
overcome over time, through a combination of
estimation and observation of quantities consumed.

Figure 1 illustrates optimal allocation of surface water
for two sub-districts.
One sub-district is at the
headworks and requires no transportation costs. The
other is more distant with commensurate costs. Curves
D1 and D2 are the net water demand curves for subdistricts 1 and 2 after deducting transport costs. The
curve DD is the combined demand of the two subdistricts and S is the (inelastic) supply of surface water.
The efficiency price is P*, where the combined demand
curve intersects the total supply curve S. Here, q1 and
q2 give the optimal allocation for each respective
subdistrict, and are the levels at which the respective
inverse demand in each subdistrict is equal to the price
P*.

A less informationally-demanding institution is water
trading. The water authority approximates entitlements
consistent with efficiency and equity. Trading then
restores efficiency without decreasing equity. But since
water at different locations is not equally valuable, the
authority needs to set appropriate trading rules and
standards.
Suppose, for example, that water is
conveyed in pipes and that leakage is negligible. In that
case, trading can be conducted on a one-for-one basis
across different locations, and water users can be
required to pay for transport costs in addition to what
they pay for the water entitlement itself. To take the
other polar extreme, suppose that transport costs consist
entirely of conveyance losses. In this case, trading can
be conducted in terms of “gross” water (i.e. water at the
headworks). Users are then entitled to receive their
allocated amount of gross water minus the conveyance
losses involved.
Alternatively, trading can be
conducted in terms of water received but the authority
establishes exchange rates that achieve the same result.
In general, if either or both types of transport costs are
present, the authority can set exchange rates as given by
the ratios of appropriate locational efficiency prices.
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Figure 1: Efficient allocation across space

Principles of Efficient Intertemporal Allocation: the
Case of Groundwater (Section 2.2)

There are a number of institutional mechanisms for
achieving, or at least approximating, efficient allocation.
To the extent that information about marginal benefits is
decentralized, decentralized mechanisms of water
allocation, especially water pricing and water trading,

In the case of groundwater (and no surface water), the
full marginal cost of water equals the marginal
extraction cost (including the user cost of construction
of the well etc.) and the marginal user cost of depleting
the groundwater resource. The latter consists of the loss
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in present value associated with extracting a unit of
water now instead of later. One such loss is the
decrease in present value from forgoing the capital gains
that would have accrued from conserving the unit. The
other is the loss in present value from having to extract
water from deeper in the well.

sources is equal. This case readily generalizes to more
than two sources.

A major source of Honolulu water supply is the Pearl
Harbor Aquifer. In that case the marginal user cost is
roughly four times the marginal extraction cost (i.e. the
full marginal cost or system efficiency price is five
times the marginal extraction cost).3

Next consider the case of two districts, each with its
own source. To illustrate the principles involved and to
facilitate the transition to the Hawaii application, we
assume that district 1 is sourced by groundwater and
that district 2 is sourced by surface water. Intradistrict
transport costs are assumed to be zero.

Unrestricted Interdistrict Allocation (Section 2.4)

In Figure 2, demand increases from Dt1 in period 1 to
Dt2 in period 2, and total marginal cost increases from
TMCt1 in period 1 to TMCt2 in period 2. Figure 2
illustrates optimal extraction from a groundwater source
in two periods. Because of the upward (but not vertical)
slope of the total marginal cost curve and because of the
tendency of demand to increase more than the total
marginal cost from one period to the next, the efficiency

Figure 3 illustrates the optimal allocation for two subcases. The water demand curve in district 1 is labeled
D1 and the demand curve in district 2 is labeled D2.
Likewise, the respective total marginal cost (TMC)
curves, or supply, for each district are labeled S1 and S2.
In the first sub-case, interdistrict transport costs are
prohibitively expensive. In such a case the optimal
solution is given by the intersection of each district’s
demand curve with its own TMC curve. Note that
efficiency price (at the intersection point) in district 1 is
higher than that of district 2, although this may change
if the demand for water is growing.

P
TMC t2
TMC t1
P t2

For the second subcase, assume that interdistrict
transport costs are zero. Total demand DD is given by
the horizontal sum of district 1 and district 2 demand
curves. Total marginal cost, or supply, is given by the
sum of groundwater S1 and surface water S2 supplies
from the two districts, and is represented by ST. In the
case shown, S2 – q2 units of water are shipped from
district 2 to district 1 in order to achieve the requirement
that the efficiency prices be equal (to P*) in both
districts.

P t1

D t2
D t1
Q

price may increase less than in the surface water case.
This tendency plays an important role in the Hawaii
simulations to follow.
Figure 2: Efficient allocation across time
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In a case like that depicted in Figure 2, water trading
can be rendered efficient by allowing forward
contracting. This is equivalent to setting exchange rates
for water in different periods according to the ratio of
efficiency prices (full marginal costs) across periods.
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Conjunctive Use With Spatially-Equivalent Sources
(Section 2.3)
Now suppose that a water district has two locationally
equivalent sources – one surface water source and one
groundwater source. The efficiency conditions are just
those of section 2.1 with the additional condition that
the full marginal cost of providing water from both
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Figure 3: Efficient conjunctive use without conveyance
costs
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optimal sharing rule for the common water source, and
Figure 5 shows the optimal water pricing rule for water
in each district over time. For the first eight years, the
full cost of producing water from the groundwater
district is so much higher than the surface water district
that even allocating all of the aqueduct water to the
former leaves the system efficiency price of district 1
higher than that of district 2. But the growth of demand
in the face of an inelastic supply causes the system
efficiency price in district two to rise faster than that in
district one (see Figure 5). Eventually, water prices in
the two districts are equal and some of

Towards a More General Model of Efficient
Intertemporal and Spatial Allocation (Section 3)
Spatial equivalence among sources facilitates a
relatively simple solution. In effect, one can subtract
the fixed quantity of surface water from demand, unify
the various groundwater sources according the principle
of equalizing the full marginal cost across wells, and
then solve the problem as if there is a single
groundwater source. When spatial equivalence does not
hold (i.e. when sources are at different locations) we
lose this separability between supply and demand.
Moreover, there is no reason to expect that water be
fungible across the entire system. Rather, the optimal
solution is likely to exhibit spatial separability between
districts, where different districts have different system
efficiency prices. However, the boundaries of these
districts are in general unknowable without doing the
optimization exercise.
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The Hawaii example discussed in this section illustrates
some of the complexities that can arise. Our discussion
is framed in the more general water allocation problem
described in the introduction. A water authority
manages water for two districts (sources of demand) and
has four water sources. Demand in each district grows
over time, possibly at different rates. Each district has
its own source of water and they can share a third
source. The first district has rechargeable groundwater
while the other district has surface water. The shared
source is surface water. The fourth source comes from
desalination, which serves as a backstop technology.
Desalination is used only when the system efficiency
price of water in a district rises to the desalination cost.
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Figure 4. Declining share of common-source water
allocated to the groundwater district
the common
source water is allocated to the second
$
district. The amount of the shared resource received by
the second district increases until eventually it receives
all of the shared water. Once the second district receives
the entire amount of the shared source, water prices then
begin to diverge, with district two prices higher than
district one prices. This process continues until both
sides adopt the backstop technology.

Efficient allocation now requires interdistrict efficiency
as well as intradistrict efficiency. The latter requires
that the marginal benefit at each location and at each
time be equal to the locational efficiency price at the
corresponding time.
Interdistrict efficiency in a
particular period requires either that the system
efficiency prices are equal across districts or that the
prices are different and that all of the common source
water is allocated to the higher-priced district (See
Smith and Roumasset 1999). Solving for the optimal
solution in this case is not obvious. One cannot, for
example, choose an allocation of common source water,
solve for the intradistrict optimal use of water then
iterate on the original allocation according to which
district has the higher efficiency price. In general, the
optimal allocation of common source water will itself
change over time.
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Assuming equal and constant marginal water transport
costs, the optimal solution for the Oahu case is
illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows the
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Figure 5. Efficiency prices over time
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As a final caveat, note that despite the prominence of
“efficiency prices” in the forgoing discussion, all of the
allocation rules refer to quantities of water. Actual
prices are not required in the mechanism chosen to
implement the efficiency rules. It is imaginable that
water quantities could be centrally chosen so as to
achieve the requisite equalities of efficiency prices
without ever having used prices in practice. Whether or
not this is advisable, depends on how knowledgeable a
central water authority may be regarding the
idiosyncratic benefits of individual users. But even the
commitment to a decentralized mechanism does not
require charging everyone the marginal cost of water for
every unit of water used. As discussed in the various
sections above, other mechanisms such as block pricing
and water trading can also be used to achieve the
efficient quantity allocations.

This example shows the potential problem inherent in
sharing rules that are constant over time (e.g., deciding
each district gets half of the shared water source each
year). This is especially true if the districts are not
allowed to trade their water allocations.
The solution described in Figures 4 and 5 can be
implemented by water prices or by trading. In the case
of pricing, a central water authority is needed to
establish pricing schedules (e.g. block pricing) that
conform to the time-denoted locational efficiency prices
established in the optimal solution. Alternatively, the
central authority can facilitate the same solution via
trading by extending the locational exchange rates
discussed in section 2.1 to inter-district trades. Under
conditions of full information, the two mechanisms will
achieve the same allocation. Trading has the usual
advantage under conditions of imperfect information in
that the market can correct mistakes in the initial
allocation. Suppose, for example, that the Water
Commission allocates the aqueduct water to the two
districts on a 50-50 basis, regardless of the year. This
will result in district 1buying water rights from district 2
before 2021 and vice versa from 2022 on.

But none of these institutional mechanisms, however
“market-based,” is capable of implementing the
efficient solution without actually exercising an
algorithm such as the one described here. A unit of
water in one time period and at one location is not
identical to that in another and cannot be traded as such.
In order to facilitate efficient water trading, a water
authority is still needed to establish exchange rates that
create equivalencies between units of water in different
times and different places according to the minimum
cost of transporting water across space and the financial
opportunity cost of “transporting” water across time. In
some cases, these exchange rates are independent and
can be announced a priori. In other cases, the exchange
rates themselves depend on the optimal solution,
necessitating the simulation exercise before the rates
can be announced.

Summary and Concluding Remarks (Section 4)
The central principle for efficient allocation of water
over space is to take water from the abundant district
and give it to the scarce district until the scarcity values
or efficiency prices are equalized. Where water is
fungible over time, as in the case of groundwater or
conjunctive use, water should be conserved to that
extent which maximizes the present value of the water
resources. That implies that the efficiency price should
be allowed to rise, albeit somewhat slower than the
prevailing interest rate. Where intra and inter-district
costs of conveyance are significant, these should be
deducted from the gross marginal benefits of water.
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ENDNOTES
1

See e.g. Chakravorty and Roumasset (1988) and
Chakravorty et. al. (1995) for formalizations of this
problem.

2

For example, 160 gallons per day per household of
four persons.

3

See Krulce et. al. (1997) for the formal model and an
application to the Pearl Harbor Aquifer.
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